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Abstract. Next generation middleware must support applications in the face of 
increasing diversity in interaction paradigms, end system types and network styles. 
Therefore, to secure applications, flexible security policies must be configured and 
indeed reconfigured at runtime. In this paper, we propose an approach combining the 
openness of reflective middleware with the flexibility of programmable security to 
meet such demands. In particular, we build a security architecture based on the 
Gridkit reflective middleware platform and the Obol security protocol programming 
language. The paper then describes a case study that uses flexible policies in order to 
secure remote procedure calls and secure group communication. We also evaluate 
this approach in terms of its security properties, flexibility, ease of use and 
extensibility. 
1    Introduction 
Developing middleware that can support secure distributed applications is an increasingly difficult task. 
Computing paradigms such as the Grid, and mobile/ ubiquitous computing all add to the increasing 
diversity in terms of interaction paradigms, end system types and underlying network styles; therefore, 
enforcing an appropriate security mechanism in these highly heterogeneous environmental conditions 
is becoming more challenging. We now analyse how this diversity impacts on security: 
− Varied interaction paradigms. The development of distributed systems can involve a wide range of 
interaction styles including: RPC, multicast-based group communication, publish/subscribe, media 
streaming, and many others. However, security mechanisms developed for the traditional client-
server model do not necessarily fit the other interaction styles; experience has shown that there are 
distinct differences in both the communication models and the security requirements.  
− Different end systems. Devices can range from: workstations, PCs, laptops to resource-poor and 
low-speed PDAs and sensors. It is difficult for every device type to support all security policies; 
for example, the cost of encryption and the processing of some security protocols may exhaust 
resource-impoverished devices. 
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Hence, we believe that flexible security policies are necessary to dynamically adapt to the divergent 
application environment. Dealing with flexible security policies will be a fundamental challenge in the 
development of future middleware solutions. Unfortunately, traditional middleware platforms, e.g. EJB 
[Su91] and CORBA [OM02] typically only provide static, fixed security mechanisms. In this paper, we 
propose an approach to apply configurable and dynamically reconfigurable security mechanisms in 
middleware platforms. This involves the integration of two complementary technologies, namely 
reflective middleware, and programmable security. That is, we develop flexible security policies using 
Obol [My05], a security protocol programming language to implement security policies. Then we 
apply them within an existing reflective middleware, Gridkit [Gr05], using a meta-model supporting 
behavioural reflection (interception). To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we present a case 
study, characterised by diversity, which demonstrates how security policies can be dynamically 
configured at runtime.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and section 3 discuss the two key 
underlying technologies. In particular, section 2 introduces the reflective middleware platform Gridkit, 
its component model (OpenCOM) and its interception meta-model. Section 3 then describes the 
programmable security capability provided by Obol. Following this, section 4 describes the security 
requirements for diverse environmental conditions, highlights the role of Obol in expressing security 
policies, and details the approach to integrate flexible security mechanisms within Gridkit. Section 5 
describes the development of a case study involving an RPC application and multicast-based group 
communication using two different device types, i.e. PC and PDA. Following this, we evaluate the 
approach used to build the security architecture in section 6, and present our conclusions and future 
work in section 7.  
2    Reflective Middleware 
2.1    Gridkit 
Application domains including multimedia, mobile computing, autonomic computing, ubiquitous 
computing, and many others, are characterised by both diversity and change. Applications can operate 
on different devices, e.g. sensors, laptops, PDAs, workstations, and clusters; applications can utilise 
different networks, e.g. fixed infrastructure, wireless and ad-hoc networks; and applications can have 
very different middleware requirements, e.g. client-server, publish-subscribe, streaming media, 
resource discovery, etc. Hence, fixed middleware solutions are inappropriate; rather middleware must 
be adaptable to suit the current application’s requirements in the given context, and middleware must 
be able to dynamically change its behaviour at run-time to manage context changes. In this section, we 
describe a middleware solution called Gridkit that can be configured, and reconfigured to support a 
wide variety of application types in highly diverse settings.  
Gridkit follows the Lancaster design philosophy [Bl01] that promotes a marriage of component 
technologies, component frameworks and reflection. Components are the building blocks of 
middleware, where a component is “a unit of composition with contractually specified interfaces, 
which can be deployed independently and is subject to third party creation” [Sz98]. This technique 
promotes configurability, re-configurability and re-use at the middleware level. Component 
frameworks manage specific domains of middleware functionality (themselves being composed of 
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other components and frameworks), in particular controlling the configuration and reconfiguration of 
the elements within. Finally, reflection is then used to provide a principled mechanism to inspect and 
dynamically adapt the component structure.  
In prior work [Gr05], we have described the overall Gridkit approach, focusing on how different 
elements of middleware functionality can be configured on-demand to meet application requirements 
in different environmental conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the tailorable Gridkit framework; this is 
essentially a component framework composed of a set of key component frameworks. At the base is 
the overlays framework (which is typically used by higher-level middleware) into which per-host 
implementations of overlay networks are plugged, for example, an Application Level Multicast plug-in 
(ALM), an epidemic routing plug-in, or a Distributed Hash Table (DHT). Above the overlays 
framework is a set of vertical frameworks providing diverse middleware behaviour. The interaction 
framework supports the plug-in of multiple interaction types (e.g. RPC, Pub-Sub, Group 
communication, Streaming, etc.) The resource discovery framework accepts plug-in strategies to 
discover resources such as CPUs and storage (e.g. peer-to-peer search), and also discover software 
services; the resource management and resource monitoring frameworks are respectively responsible 


















Figure 1: The Gridkit Architecture 
[Gr05] also describes how a declarative policy-based mechanism drives the configuration and 
reconfiguration of the architecture. Using context information (e.g. current device type, or network 
style), the correct policy is selected and applied across the framework, plugging the appropriate 
functionality into each of the core frameworks. In this paper, we are investigating the approach further 
by defining mechanisms to configure and reconfigure non-functional concerns (in this case security) 
within this framework, and in particular within the interaction framework.  
2.2    OpenCOMJ and the Interception Meta-model 
OpenCOMJ is a lightweight Java component model that implements the OpenCOM component 
runtime specification [Co04], and is used to implement every component and framework in the Gridkit 
architecture. Each component implements a set of custom interfaces and receptacles. An interface 
expresses a unit of service provision, whereas a receptacle describes a unit of service requirement. A 
connection is the binding between an interface and a receptacle of the same type. OpenCOMJ deploys a 
standard runtime substrate that manages the creation and deletion of components, acts upon requests to 
connect/disconnect components and provides service interfaces for reflective operations. The runtime 
substrate dynamically maintains a system graph of the components currently in use. This explicit 
maintenance of dynamic dependencies between components provides the support for introspection and 
reconfiguration of component architectures. OpenCOMJ also supports a component framework model 
[Gr03]. Here, a framework is a single OpenCOMJ component (seen in figure 2), which then contains 
its own internal structure (a graph of components). Each framework is extended by the 
ICFMetaArchitecture interface, which provides reflective operations to inspect and dynamically 
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reconfigure the framework’s local component architecture. 
                
Figure 2: Components and Component Frameworks in OpenCOMJ 
Crucially, OpenCOMJ also provides an interception meta-model. This supports the inspection, 
insertion, and deletion of interceptors to individual interfaces. Interceptors can be either pre, or post, 
i.e. they are invoked before or after each operation call on that interface. In OpenCOMJ, interceptors 
are implemented as individual Java methods that follow a particular syntax, as seen in figure 3. The 
parameters contain the method name and the methods arguments. Hence, the interceptor can monitor 
and manipulate the behaviour of the interface. Each OpenCOMJ interface is delegated using Java 
dynamic proxies; essentially the interface call is trapped, the attached pre methods are executed in 
order, the original method is called dynamically, and finally the post methods are executed. As will be 
seen below, it is this mechanism that enables the dynamic insertion of security policies into Gridkit. 
 
Figure 3: Implementing Pre and Post Interceptors in OpenCOMJ 
3    Programmable Security 
3.1    The Case for Programmable Security 
It is a very challenging problem to address security requirements in dynamic and changeable 
application domains. Firstly, security is usually treated as an add-on property and is rarely properly 
considered in the design and implementation of a system. This will inevitably increase the complexity 
whilst decreasing the effectiveness of security implementation. Secondly, traditional tools used to build 
security solutions only work as expected in a very specific environment, where all assumptions are 
clearly defined and supported. However, because the real world is neither static nor globally controlled, 
change will occur and, gradually, the security solution will become more and more mismatched to the 
dynamic environment and its applications (the reason for this is often a very tight integration between 
application and a security solution). In addition, the security features in both low-level cryptography 
functions and high-level security mechanisms are very complex to understand and implement, 
especially in the dynamic environment. We propose programmable security as a solution to these 
problems [An03].  We have limited the scope of the security problems we address to the ones related to 
communication, that is, security protocols. We believe that the most interesting issues (security-wise) 
revolve around communication (e.g. both message passing and invocation), such as secrecy, integrity, 
authenticity, non-repudiation, and so on.  
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In order to maximize the flexibility of secure communication solutions, and at the same time separate a 
solution from the application, we have designed and implemented a language and runtime for 
expressing and running security protocols in a highly dynamic manner. This allows us to express 
security protocols at a very high level of abstraction, with clearly defined separation of concerns, 
boundaries, and interfaces to the application domain. 
3.2    Obol: a Security Protocol Language 
The security protocol language Obol is greatly influenced by the numerous logics used for analyzing 
security protocols, e.g. [Bu90] [Sy96]. These logics deal with security issues at a very high level of 
abstraction, leaving other matters to the system of deployment, i.e. the implementation. The Obol 
language mirrors this by keeping the level of abstraction used to express a security protocol as high-
level as possible, while delegating low-level concerns, such as message representation and data 
transfer, to its runtime. This means that security protocols can be expressed by very short textual 
descriptions, called scripts, which only deal with the security problem at hand. Unlike the logics used 
for analysis, and other security protocol implementations, Obol is designed for protocol endpoints, and 
it is not required for Obol to be used by all protocol participants.  
For security protocols, the interesting concerns are: manipulating local state, what to encrypt and 
decrypt, what to digitally sign and verify, what data to send, and what's expected to be received during 
a correct protocol run.  Together with a syntactic notation, Obol provides eight fundamental operands 
that address these concerns: believe and generate, for manipulating local state; encrypt and decrypt, 
sign and verify, for the same-named cryptographic operations; and send and receive for expressing 
what messages to send and expect to receive.  There are other operands for manipulating Obol 
language objects, and interacting with the Obol runtime. 
In its current incarnation, the Obol language is interpreted in a runtime named “Lobo” implemented in 
Java. The runtime deals with all matters not addressed by the Obol language, such as loading and 
controlling protocol scripts, message representation, sending and receiving messages, etc. These issues 
are modularized, and can be replaced or updated at need. Figure 4 shows an overview of the Lobo 
structure.  
                                                       
                                                                  Figure 4: Obol Runtime (Lobo) Overview 
Applications interact first with the runtime itself to load, select and start a particular script, and then the 
application interacts with the script instance through a script-handle during the protocol run. The 
script-handle allows the application to inspect the script instance, to provide or retrieve various 
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parameters and results, as well as interacting with the protocol run, to provide/retrieve intermediate 
data, error state and so on. Typical parameters provided by the application are long-term identity keys, 
names, peer-addresses, and payload data.  The result retrievable varies greatly depending on the 
protocol; some protocols yield a result simply by not failing [Go95]. This reflection is also available to 
the scripts themselves, allowing one script to use another. 
The language does not make any assumptions on how messages communicate; in particular, messages 
need not be transported over the same medium during a protocol session. The runtime keeps a pool of 
delivered messages, and a matching algorithm determines if a delivered message is to be received by a 
script instance. Also, no assumptions are made on how messages are represented nor how they are 
structured. The exact manner of message transport is handled by the Obol runtime and is modularized 
so that new ways of communication can be added. The manner of communication can be configured at 
runtime, either by the Obol scripts themselves, or through parameters passed from an application. This 
allows an application utilizing Obol as its security protocol machinery to adapt to changing situations, 
for example, an application can switch the actual protocol used, or just change some parameter of the 
protocol, such as the encryption algorithm being used, or the manner of communication. 
4    Flexible Security Policies in Gridkit 
4.1    Security Requirements of Diverse Environmental Conditions 
To prevent attacks in the form of masquerading, tampering, eavesdropping and denial of service, it is 
necessary to guarantee key security properties such as entity authentication, data integrity, 
confidentiality, non-repudiation, authorization, validation, access control etc. There are many 
cryptography techniques provided to support message security. For example, shared-key or public-key 
based encryption/decryption for confidentiality, MAC and digital signatures for data integrity and non-
repudiation, access control technologies (e.g. ACL or ACM) for authorization. Moreover, a series of 
key establishment protocols are used in authentication, key transport and key agreement. Table 1 shows 
a selection of basic two-party protocols. Additionally, some protocols provide multi-party support such 
as n-Party Diffie-Hellman protocol [St96], secret sharing technique [Me96], conference protocol 
[Me96] etc. 
Type Protocol (properties) 
Key transport protocol based on 
symmetric encryption 
Point-to-point key update (no server) 
Shamir’s no key protocol (no server) 
Kerberos authentication protocol (server based) 
Needham-Shroeder shared-key protocol (server based) 
Otway-Rees (server based)
 
Key transport protocol based on 
asymmetric encryption 
Basic PK encryption (1-pass) (no entity authentication) 
X.509 (2-pass) -timestamps (mutual entity authentication) 
X.509 (3-pass) –random  (mutual entity authentication) 
Beller-Yacobi (4-pass) (mutual entity authentication) 
Beller-Yacobi (2-pass) (unilateral entity authentication) 
Key agreement protocol Diffie-Hellman (entity authentication) 
ELGamal key agreement (key entity authentication) 
STS (mutual entity authentication) 
                                                      Table 1: Selected Protocols [Me96] 
It is well known that the definition of security mechanisms is highly dependent on the requirements of 
the application you want to protect, i.e., the required security principles, the handling attack types, and 
so on. Therefore, security policies must match the environmental conditions. Heterogeneous interaction 
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paradigms demand flexible and dynamic security policies. Consider for example RPC, group 
communication and publish-subscribe interaction paradigms. In the client-server model, the system can 
employ approaches such as Kerberos [St88], the Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol [Ne78] or 
public-key mutual authentication protocol [Gl00] for entity authentication. Moreover, MAC, digital 
signatures as well as encryption/decryption technology can be used to guarantee privacy and data 
integrity. Group communication is a significantly more complex interaction type compared to client-
server. Its characteristics are: i) potentially large scale groups; ii) dynamic joining and leaving of 
members resulting in the update of group security parameters (group key and group view) in order to 
prevent new joiners from eavesdropping previous messages, and leavers from looking at future 
messages; iii) flexibility: the joiner is allowed to be a member when all other members agree with it. To 
ensure the validity of a group member as well as the privacy, integrity and freshness of messages 
delivered between group members, it is necessary to choose appropriate security mechanisms to cope 
with the generation, distribution and management of group keys. Secure authenticated key agreement 
protocols for dynamic peer groups [At00], key graph solution for scalable group security [Wo98], and 
the Burmester-Desmedt conference protocol [Me96] are some of the optional techniques to meet 
different system requirements e.g. in terms of being lightweight, scalable, etc. Finally, in the area of 
publish-subscribe, security protection focuses more on the cryptographical binding between type name 
and type definition, as well as the authenticity and integrity of messages [Ba05].   
In addition, developers need to consider the trade-offs involved in the security techniques. Public key 
encryption is slower than symmetric encryption algorithms due to the level of computation involved, so 
public key cryptography may be unusable for resource-poor devices; furthermore, according to [Di03], 
long-term key based encryption slows performance even using today’s high-power processors. 
Therefore, developers need to weigh the need for strong encryption versus system performance; 
moreover, even if we neglect the cost of encryption technology (e.g. RSA, DES, AES etc.), because 
encryption or any security-enabling technique will add overhead to communication, this also leads to 
increased memory and processing costs. In the final analysis, security mechanisms will vary depending 
on the end-system types they can execute on.  
4.2    Implementing Security Policies in Obol 
To support the different security requirements we adopt Obol to program flexible security policies 
according to its fundamental characteristics; namely it is “high-level”, i.e. easy to implement because 
the simple syntax is close to the standard description of the security protocol; and it is “programmable”, 
i.e. security policies can be configured and reconfigured at runtime.  
Security policies in our architecture are classified into several parts depending on which security 
properties it achieves, e.g. entity authentication, data integrity, message privacy as well as securing the 
private key and so on. The implementation of every security policy is an Obol program. Figure 5 
represents a simple Obol program to perform message encryption and transmission (using the believe  
                                                        
                                                         Figure 5: An Obol Program            
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primitive to bind names to values and the send primitive to actually send the encrypted message).                
As mentioned in section 3.2, Obol defines how to express a given security protocol. These Obol 
programs must be interpreted and executed in the runtime Lobo. Figure 6 shows how to initiate a Lobo 
instance and load an Obol program. 
                                        
                                        Figure 6: Load and Execute an Obol Program 
Due to the clean decoupling between protocol implementation and protocol execution, security 
protocols can be programmed before or after an application is designed and implemented. Moreover, 
the loading of Obol programs occurs at runtime so the fluctuation of security policies will not affect 
other parts of the system. This simplifies the update of security policies and also achieves dynamic 
configuration and runtime reconfiguration of security policies.  
4.3    Integration of Flexible Security Mechanisms into Gridkit 
Section 2.2 described the interception meta-model of OpenCOM; this forms the basis of our reflective 
security architecture. An Obol program (the implementation of the security protocol) must be loaded in 
the Lobo runtime before it can execute; the reflective mechanism of Gridkit is well-suited to this task, 
i.e. the interceptor provides an environment to install the runtime Lobo and execute a given security 
protocol at a particular point in the “middleware path”. In this way, the update and replacement of the 
security protocol used is separated from the logic of the core middleware functionality.  
In detail, we designed our security architecture based on the principle of a clear “separation of 
concerns” between the application logic and the security service. We employ interceptors to execute all 
security related operations so that end-users can focus on the application development rather than 
security implementation. As a result, in a given application, interceptors are responsible for 
intercepting the application logic chain and triggering the appropriate security mechanisms. In addition, 
we adopt interaction/role based configuration in order to adapt the security mechanism to the current 
requirements and environmental conditions. In other words, “interaction/role” is viewed as a path to the 
security architecture configuration, e.g. RMI/Client, RMI/Server, Group/SL or Pub-Sub/Publisher and 
so on. Here, the “interaction/role” decides the interception points while the “role” (potentially together 
with some other context information at runtime) decides the pre- and post- method-call and the loaded 
Obol program. The API SecurityConfigurator:InterceptorConfigure() used to configure security 
architecture is presented in figure 7.  
 
 
 Figure 7: API for Configuring Security Architecture 
The steps involved in the process of configuration are as followed:  
public class SecurityConfigurator{ 
    public SecurityConfigurator(OpenCOM runtime, IOpenCOM pIOCM, String configureInfoPath){} 




1. Read the configuration file (see the example in section 5) according to the “interaction” type and 
the “role”  
2. Lookup the required components from the system graph of components; this is supported by 
architecture meta-model of OpenCOM [Bl01] 
3. Attach the interceptors to the interfaces according to the “role”, or execute other security related 
operations, such as initiating the authentication server.   
The configuration aims to dynamically set the interception points at runtime. After this, the original call 
invocation will be intercepted, and the pre- and post- methods will be triggered before and after the 
call. The runtime Lobo will be installed and the appropriate security mechanism (an Obol program) 
matching the current context information will be loaded dynamically. In summary, the security 
architecture applied to Gridkit is configurable, orthogonal and crosscuts core middleware functionality 
to guarantee a series of security objectives including authentication, data integrity, privacy, non-
repudiation and others.  
5    Case Study 
In this section, we present one scenario (shown in figure 8) featuring both RPC and multicast-based 
group communication. In the scenario, node A, node B and the server are located in different domains. 
Client A and client B invoke services from the server located in domain1. A only supports a shared-key 
system, while B supports both shared-key and public-key based systems but no support for the 
Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol. Additionally, B joins a chat group and talks to other group 
members. We configure the security architecture for the two different interaction paradigms on two 
types of devices (PC and PDA); this demonstrates how programmable security is integrated into our 
reflective middleware platform, and shows how flexible security policies can be dynamically 
configured to adapt to the heterogeneous environmental conditions. We adopt the approach mentioned 
in section 4.3 to build secure distributed applications and illustrate the concrete details behind each 
step.  
 
                           Figure 8: Application Scenario Featuring Client–Server and Group Communication 
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The configuration of the security architecture is based on the API method: 
SecurityConfigerator:ConfigureInteceptor(). The operations it performs are to discover which points in 
the middleware need to be intercepted, and then attach the correct interceptors at this point, i.e. adding 
pre- and post- methods to the call chain. The configuration information based on two different 
interaction types (RMI and group communication) is tabulated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Configuration Information in Heterogeneous Interaction Types 
The configuration information is defined in a plain text file (in the future, we will define it using 
XML). At the application start-up, the SecurityConfigurator is initiated and obtains the contextInfoPath 
(see API in figure 7). Following the data from Table 2 for RPC, the SecurityConfigurator associated 
with client A and client B will realize the context information “RMI/Client”, will check the 
configuration file, look up the component called “JavaRMI”, attach the “rmi_c_interceptor” to the 
interface called “IClientRemoteProcedureCall” and then add the pre0, pre1, pre2 and post0 methods 
written in the rmi_c_interceptor to the invocation chain. However, if A joins a chat group, the 
SecurityConfigurator associated with it will realize it as “Group/Joiner”, look up the component called 
“GroupManagement”, attach the “join_interceptors” to the interface named as “IGroupManagement” 
and add m_pre0 and m_post0 methods written in the join_interceptor.  
The interception meta-model allows programmers to define security behaviours (pre-/post- methods) in 
advance. The pre-defined actions are triggered at runtime when the invocation happens. In order to 
make the security mechanisms modular, we separate every security policy into different pre- or post- 
method calls. We then adopt a “context-based selection” mechanism to dynamically select which pre-
/post- methods will be performed. Figure 9 illustrates that pre methods can be executed in order as 
shown in path 1, or selectively executed as in path 2 (which uses context information to select a path 
through the interceptors). The dynamic composition of pre-defined actions not only increases the 
flexibility of interception behaviours, it also facilitates dynamic configuration and more general 
extensibility of security mechanisms at runtime.   
 
          Figure 9: Interception Behaviours in the ‘context-based selection’ Mechanism 
More details follow in terms of the concrete description of how RPC and group security are deployed. 
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5.1    RPC Security 
The first example focuses on the provision of a security architecture for Gridkit’s RPC interaction type. 
Figure 10 depicts the workflow of this architecture in detail. In this example, the server provides a 
simple patient record service allowing doctors to read a patient’s medical record. If the client is 
authorized, it will be returned the corresponding record to the passed parameter (patientID). In this 
scenario, there are two clients: A (a PDA client being used by a doctor in a hospital) and B (a PC client 
being used by a general practitioner) supporting different security mechanisms; hence, it is essential to 
negotiate the security mechanism they will use for message exchange. In detail, at the beginning of the 
application, the server configures the appropriate Gridkit interaction type [Gr05] and hosts the patient 
record service, it also invokes the SecurityConfigurator:ConfigureInterceptor(). After this is done, an 
authentication server is generated and pre- and post- methods are attached. The client configures itself 
in the same way and invokes the record service with the contextInfo (“PDA” or “PC” in this case) and 
value (patientID) as the parameter called InputParameters.  
     
Figure 10: Workflow Overview in RMI Application 
As shown in figure 10, pre0 in the client side is triggered first when the client invokes the service. It 
contacts the authentication server and negotiates the authentication protocol to be used. The 
authentication server then creates a new thread for every incoming client for authentication. The pre- 
and post- method, as well as the authentication server will install Lobo and allow the runtime to load 
and execute an associated Obol program according to the context information.  
Needham-Schroeder (N-S) Public-key Mutual Authentication Group Communication Protocol 
1 A->B: A 
2 B->A: {RB}KB 
3 A->KDC: RA, A, B, {RB}KB 
4 KDC->A: {KAB, RA, B, {A, RB,   
KAB}KB}KA 
5 A->B: {R1}KAB, {A, RB,                 
KAB}KB 
6 B->A: {R1-1, R2}KAB 
7 A->B: {R2-1}KAB 
1 A->CA: A, KA+* 
2 CA->A: A, KA+, CA, {H(A, KA+, CA)} KCA- 
3 B->CA: B, KB+ 
4 CA->B: B, KB+, CA, {H(B, KB+, CA)} KCA- 
5 A->B: A, KA+, CA, {H(A, KA+, CA)} KCA- 
6 B->A: RB 
7 A->B: {H(RB)} KA- 
8 B->A: B, KB+, CA, {H(B, KB+, CA)} KCA- 
9 A->B: RA 




[*: A public/ private key pair (KA+ , KA-)] 
Join protocol: 
1 Joiner->SL: A, RA 
2 SL->KDC: SL, A, RSL 
3 KDC->SL: [  SL,A = {A}KSL XOR      
{SL}KA] ,{RSL}KSL 
4 SL->Joiner: SL, {RA, g, {g, 
A}SKg}  SL,A* 
5 Joiner->group: A, {g, A}SKg 
6 SL->group: g, (A,{g+1, SKg+1}  SL,A), 
(B,{g+1, SKg+1}  SL,B)... 
 
Leave protoocl:  
SL->group: g, (A,{g+1, SKg+1}  SL,A), 
(B,{g+1, SKg+1}  SL,B)... 
[*:  SL,A = {SL}KA] 
Table 3: Protocol Description [NB: the number like “1” stands for Message1] 
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In our scenario, the authentication between A and the server is based on the Needham-Schroeder 
protocol, while a public key based mutual authentication protocol is used between B and the server 
(please refer to Table 3 which lists the protocol description and Table 4 which presents the Obol 
programs for each participant in the protocol). Once the authentication finishes successfully, A will get 
a shared key with the server while B will obtain the certificate of the server. At the same time, both A 
and B get the connection_ID for accessing the service. The server also writes messages into the 
database (DB), including connection_ID as well as security mechanisms related to this connection_ID. 
After authentication, pre1 or pre2 performs the message encryption operation presented in figure 11, 
and also attaches the connection_ID to the encrypted messages. The server at the other side 
authenticates the connection_ID and queries security mechanisms related to this call. It tells Lobo 
which Obol program is loaded for decrypting the message. The record will be delivered in the same 
way from server to client.  
Protocol Implementation 
Client side [A] Server side [B] Key Distribution Certer N-S 
[self “localhost:6000”] 
(believe B “localhost:7000” host) 
(believe KDC “localhost:8000” host) 
(believe KA (load “c:/KA.key”) shared-
key  ((alg AES)(size 128))) 
1 (send B “A”) 
2 (receive B *1) 
3 (generate RA nonce 16) 
  (send KDC RA “A” “B” *1) 
4 (receive KDC (decrypt KA *KAB RA 
“B” *2)) 
 (believe KAB *KAB shared-key ((alg 
AES)(size 128))) 
5 (generate R1 nonce 16) 
  (send B (encrypt KAB R1) *2) 
6 (believe *R R1 ((type number))) 
  (generate *R1_1 eval lisp “(- *R 1)” *R) 
  (believe R1_1 *R1_1 ((type binary))) 
  (receive B (decrypt KAB R1_1 *R2)) 
7 (believe *R *R2 ((type number))) 
  (generate *R2_1 eval lisp “(- *R 1)” *R) 
  (send B (encrypt KAB *R2_1)) 
[self "localhost:7000"]  
(believe KB (load "c:/KB.key") shared-
key ((alg AES)(size 128))) 
  
1 (receive *a *A_ID)   
2 (generate RB nonce 16) 
 (send *a (encrypt KB RB)) 
5 (receive *a *1 *2) 
 (decrypt (KB *2) *A_ID RB *KAB) 
 (believe KAB *KAB shared-key ((alg 
AES) (size 128))) 
 (believe f "c:/kab_b.key" file.out) 
 (send f KAB) 
 (decrypt (KAB *1) *R1) 
6 (believe R1 *R1 ((type number))) 
 (generate *R1-1 eval lisp “(- *R1 1)” *R1) 
 (believe R1-1 *R1-1 ((type binary))) 
 (generate R2 nonce 16) 
 (send *a (encrypt KAB R1-1 R2)) 
7 (believe *R2 R2 ((type number))) 
 (believe *R2_1 eval lisp “(- *R2 1)” *R2) 
  (receive *a (decrypt KAB R2_1)) 
[self "localhost:8000"] 
(believe KA (load 
"c:/KA.key") shared-key 
((alg AES) (size 128))) 
(believe KB (load 
"c:/KB.key") shared-key 
((alg AES)(size 128))) 
   
3 (receive *a *RA *A_ID 
*B_ID *1) 
 (decrypt (KB *1) *RB) 
 
4 (generate KAB shared-
key AES 128) 
 (believe *2 (encrypt KB 
*A_ID *RB KAB)) 
 (send *a (encrypt KA KAB 
*RA *B_ID *2)) 




[input A_ID string] 
[self "localhost:6700"] 
(believe B “localhost:7000” host) 
(believe CA "localhost:6111" host) 
(believe KA-  (load “c:/A_ Kprivate.key“) 
private-key) 
(believe KA+  (load "c:/A_Kpublic.key") 
public-key) 
(believe KCA+  (load "c:/CA_Kpublic.key") 
public-key) 
1 (send CA A_ID KA+) 
2 (receive CA A_ID KA+  *CA_ID *s_a) 
5 (send B A_ID KA+  *CA_ID *s_a) 
6 (receive B *RB) 
7 (send B (sign KA-  *RB)) 
8 (receive B *B_ID *KB+  *CA_ID 
(verify KCA+  *B_ID *KB+  *CA_ID) 
9 (generate RA nonce 128) 
 (send B RA) 
10 (receive B (verify KB+  RA)) 
 
[input B_ID string] 
[self "localhost:7000"] 
(believe CA "localhost:6111" host) 
(believe KB-  (load "c:/B_Kprivate.key") 
private-key) 
(believe KB+  (load "c:/B_Kpublic.key") 
public-key) 
(believe KCA+  (load "c:/CA_Kpublic.key") 
public-key) 
3 (send CA B_ID KB+) 
4 (receive CA B_ID KB+ *CA_ID *s_b) 
5 (receive *a *A_ID *KA+ *CA_ID *s_a) 
 (verify (KCA+ *s_a) *A_ID *KA+ 
*CA_ID) 
6 (generate RB nonce 128) 
 (send *a RB) 
7 (receive *a (verify *KA+ RB) 
8 (send *a B_ID KB+ *CA_ID *s_b) 
9 (receive *a *RA) 
10 (send *a (sign KB- *RA)) 
[self "localhost:6111"] 




1 (receive *a *A_ID 
*KA+)  
2 (believe *s_a (sign  KCA- 
*A_ID *KA+ "CA")) 
 (send *a *A_ID *KA+ 
"CA" *s_a)  
 
3 (receive *b *B_ID 
*KB+)  
4 (believe *s_b (sign  KCA- 
*B_ID *KB+ "CA")) 
 (send *b *B_ID *KB+ 
"CA" *s_b)  
 
Table 4: Protocol Implementation in Obol [NB: the number like “1” means the implementation for Message1] 
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                    Figure 11: Message Encryption  
5.2    Multicast-based Group Communication Security 
In this example, to secure group communication, we utilise a lightweight authentication protocol based 
on Leithton-Micali key distribution algorithm [Mc98] (as described in Table 3). The founder of the 
group, or the earliest joiner based on the current group view (if the founder left) is viewed as the 
session leader (hereafter SL). Every joiner must contact the SL before joining. We use the same 
approach described in section 5.1 to configure the pre- and post- methods according to Table 2. The 
JoinGroup() call will trigger the authentication protocol executed in the m_pre0 method. After the 
authentication is done, the SL generates a new group key for the new group view and multicasts it to all 
members in the group. Member joins and leaves lead to the fluctuation of the group key, so we install a 
runtime Lobo in the post method join_interceptor:m_post() of JoinGroup() call to listen to the new 
group key (as presented in figure 12). Moreover, the SendMessage() call will trigger the message 
encryption before it is transported. The message exchanged among group members is encrypted with 
the fresh group key, so people outside the group will not understand it. In addition, when one of the 
members leaves the group, the post method of LeaveGroup() call will trigger the generation and 
distribution of a new group key. Especially when the SL leaves the group, the earliest joiner in the 
current group view will receive a notification and reconfigure itself as a SL, including generating an 
authentication server (the part distinct from usual membership, seen in figure 12) and loading the 
authentication protocol. The interceptors that implement this security mechanism are applied in the 
same manner as for RPC; however, due to space limitations, more details of this implementation are 
not given here. 
                   
                 Figure 12: Member 4 Joins a Chat Group  
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6    Evaluation 
In this section, we analyze our approach to building security architectures in Gridkit. We focus on four 
core aspects as follows: 
  ) Security. We adopted Obol to define security mechanisms. Currently, we have implemented a rich 
set of security policies, including authentication protocols, secret key based encryption/decryption, 
public-key based encryption/decryption, MAC, digital signatures, and private key management. These 
security mechanisms protect a given application by enforcing properties such as authentication, 
integrity, privacy and non-repudiation. 
   ) Flexibility. The interception meta-model in our reflective middleware platform provides the 
possibility to modify the behaviour defined by the business logic of a given application. The 
combination of this reflective feature within the Gridkit middleware platform and programmable 
security supported in Obol makes it possible to dynamically configure and re-configure flexible 
security mechanisms at runtime to meet application requirements in the environmental context.   
    ) Ease of use. Firstly, Obol allows the security developer to escape the distractions of low-level 
implementation efforts. For example, issues such as message representation, cryptographic 
transformation, etc. are handled in Lobo, so the security developer can focus on designing effective 
security mechanisms without consideration of low-level cryptographic functions. Additionally, the use 
of Obol also avoids errors introduced by the implementation of security protocols. Finally, Obol is easy 
to use because the syntax is similar to the traditional notation of the protocol. In our experience, new 
protocols can be introduced into the framework with considerable ease; once the overall framework 
was established, we were able to introduce new security mechanisms by programming security policies 
in Obol, then updating the interceptors and configuration files (for example, the time to develop a 
public key mutual protocol was approximately six hours). 
  ) Extensibility. We adopted the interception meta-model of the Gridkit reflective middleware 
platform to construct interceptor based security. This allowed us for example to implement a security 
architecture to support existing RPC and group communication interaction types; we can now follow 
this approach to freely extend other available interaction styles such as publish-subscribe, media 
streaming etc, based on the well-defined interface and the programmable features of the security 
mechanisms. To some extent, we believe there is the potential to extend other traditional middleware 
platforms (e.g. CORBA and EJB, which support similar interception capabilities) with our flexible 
security policies.  
7    Conclusions and Future Work  
In this paper, we have discussed an approach to integrate our programmable security architecture into 
the Gridkit middleware platform to support flexible security policies that adapt to heterogeneous 
environmental conditions. We adopt two complementary technologies: the interception meta-model of 
the OpenCOM component model and the programmable security capabilities of Obol to build a 
security architecture in the Gridkit reflective middleware platform. This combination is capable of 
supporting configurable, reconfigurable, and flexible security policies.  
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To date, we have designed and implemented a set of security mechanisms to support the RPC and 
multicast-based group interaction models. Currently we have a mature implementation of the prototype 
to support dynamic configuration of flexible security policies to adapt to varied device types in the 
RPC model and we are now extending the security architecture for the group communication model for 
robustness, and to include a wider range of selectable security services.  
Although we have made considerable progress in achieving configuration and reconfiguration of 
security policies in a reflective middleware platform, this is just a start and a lot remains to be 
investigated. We have focused on security policies to support secure RPC and group communication 
addressing security properties such as authentication, integrity, privacy and non-repudiation. Future 
work is planned to complement these security mechanisms to guarantee more security principles such 
as authorization and access control. We also aim to investigate security in alternative paradigms like 
publish/subscribe, tuple-space and media streaming. Additionally, we have addressed dynamic 
configuration of two interaction paradigms upon two types of devices. More ambitious explorations in 
the future will focus on implementing runtime reconfiguration of flexible security policies (cf. self-
organising security policies). Furthermore, Gridkit is characterized by the two layered component 
framework [Gr05] featuring an interaction framework layer supported by an overlay framework. It is 
also interesting to investigate security policies at the overlay level of Gridkit and how these might 
relate to more end-to-end policies as studied in this paper.  
The interception meta-model in the reflective middleware is a cornerstone of our approach to achieve 
configuration and reconfiguration of flexible security policies. Future work is planned to explore and 
extend the current interception meta-model to support more flexible interception behaviours. However, 
the reflection feature also hides some dangers such as arbitrarily loading and deleting interceptors or 
freely interposing the interceptors without authorization.  Therefore, securing interception is also 
crucial for our approach. We are examining special components called ‘security mediators’ to control 
access to the component runtime to protect ‘dangerous’ APIs such as interception. In the future, the 
TCB (Trusted Computing Base) concept will be the base of our security mechanism, authorizing 
operations on the potentially open interception mechanism.  
In addition, a separate project at Lancaster is addressing how to apply aspect-oriented programming 
(AOP) techniques to the component-oriented approach as used in OpenCOM to enhance how 
developers deal with crosscutting concerns. There is considerable potential in considering the role of 
aspect-oriented techniques to identify aspects and join points and investigate how this would be 
supported through interception (effectively providing a higher level view of statement of cross-cutting 
concerns such as security). Moreover, future work is also planed to investigate the possibility to apply 
Model Driven Development (MDD) to our programmable security architecture. 
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